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Heidegger's Nichts
According to Heidegger, Nothing’s cataclysmic disclosure im­
parts that Dasein’s existence is not fully realized, that its fully-realized 
existence as Dasein is a possibility to be achieved. In an average, every­
day mode of existence, one is preoccupied exclusively with beings. On­
ly through dread can one be jarred out of one’s everydayness and into 
an awareness of a dimension other than beings. This awareness is 
facilitated because dread (in contrast to fear) is confrontation with 
Nothing. By facing Nothing, one is forced to deal with an entirely 
foreign realm, one that eludes one’s ordinary transaction with beings. 
Nothing not only has none of the characteristics of being, it is incom­
prehensible, defying everyday reflective formulations, every notion one 
ever had about beings. It discloses the fact that there is “more” than be­
ings, that there is a dimension which “transcends” beings: “This ‘be- 
ing-beyond’,” Heidegger writes, “we call transcendence.”1
1 Einfiihrung in die Metaphysik, 2nd ed. (Tubingen: Niemeyer, 1958), pp. 84-85.
2 Was ist Metaphysik?, Sth ed. (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1949), p. 32.
Dread, however, is not only intrinsic to the revealment of what is 
“beyond” beings, but also is intrinsic to the genuine revealment of be­
ings per se—“it alone brings Da-Sein face to face with beings as 
such”2—and by vivid contrast (to Nothing) beings “are” beings: “On­
ly in the bright night of the Nothing of dread are beings as such re­
vealed in their original openness: that they are beings and not 
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Nothing.”3 Moreover, Nothing not only discloses beings as such, it 
discloses to Dasein Dasein ’s own Being. As Heidegger explains, “If Da- 
sein were not projected from the beginning into Nothing, it could never 
relate to beings, not even to itself.”4 Dasein does not exist because of 
an objective world or because of a confrontation with other beings; it 
exists because of a confrontation with Nothing. Nothing, thus, is the 
transcendental a priori for the vivid realization of beings, and for Da- 
sein’s ownmost potentiality for Being.
’ Ibid., p. 31.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., p. 32.
6 Ibid., p. 29.
By dread Heidegger does not mean the usual sort of “anxiousness” 
(Angstlichkeit) associated with “nervousness” (Furchtsamkeity 
whereas anxiousness takes place within the realm of beings and is a 
response to beings, dread is a response to Nothing. In dread one feels 
“uncanny” (unheimlichy one is in “suspense” (schweben), and “there 
is nothing to hold on to,”5 suggesting that one cannot rely on rational 
resources—any resources—before Nothing’s onslaught. In dread Da­
sein is not attracted to Nothing, but having felt its presence (the 
presence of an absence), recoils. The very nature of Nothing, Heideg­
ger contends, is “repelling” (abweisend). This is not merely a repel­
ling, however, for in being repelled, Dasein is then turned towards be­
ings and Being. This is why Heidegger maintains that “repelling from 
itself is essentially an expelling into”6—an expelling into an awareness 
of beings in which they are suddenly more vivid than they ever have 
been, and an awareness of a dimension entirely “other,” the dimen­
sion of Being. This also accounts for Heidegger’s description of Da- 
sein’s retreat from Nothing as “spell-bound peace” (gebannte Ruhe). 
After the dread of Nothing, after the discovery of beings and Being ge­
nuinely for the first time, there is this peaceful repose.
Since logic is only capable of treating beings, in Nothing’s presence 
logic collapses. Part of the difficulty of thinking is the dilemma of rais­
ing questions. Thinking’s genuineness, according to Heidegger, is a 
measure of its ability to raise questions; and the problem with Western 
thinking in general is not so much a failure to provide adequate 
answers, but more fundamentally a failure to raise adequate questions.
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This is the gist of Heidegger’s contention that “the very notion of 
'logic* disintegrates in the whirlpool of a more original questioning.’*7 
For Heidegger, logic is not “the highest court of appeal” (die hochste 
Instanz); in fact, the most elementary tools of logic—“question and 
answer” (Frage und Antwort)—he insists “are equally nonsensical in 
themselves in a concern with Nothing.”8 Reason is inadequate for 
treating Nothing because Nothing is the “ground” of one of reason’s 
facets: negation.
7 Ibid., p. 31.
8 Ibid., p. 33.
9 Ibid., p. 25.
10 Ibid., p. 26.
The fact that there can be something called negation is based on a 
more fundamental dimension of negation prior to logical negation, 
allowing logical negation to be possible. As Heidegger explains, “More 
original than the not and negation is 'Nothing’.”9 By the same token, 
the “yea” of reason, its affirmative character, is based on a more fun­
damental process. Both Being and Nothing, therefore, are dimensions 
transcending reason, and a more original and primordial mode of 
thinking is essential if one is to have access to them. Because of logic’s 
limitations, it cannot raise questions which surpass metaphysical mat­
ters. It is precisely Dasein's collision with Nothing, then, that 
challenges logic, forcing it to fathom the limits of rational intelligibili­
ty. Nothing is the necessary catalytic to Being’s unconcealment, 
because a confrontation with Nothing is the only way rational thinking 
can recognize its boundary and fathom what beings are not, what 
transcends them. Thus Heidegger writes that “within the horizon of 
scientific conception, which only knows beings, that which is absolute­
ly not beings (Being) is capable of presenting itself only as Nothing.”10 
Metaphysical thinking is essentially about “something.” But how can 
metaphysics “think” when confronted with Nothing’s vacuousness? 
Here is metaphysics’ maelstrom: helplessly it whirls before an abysmal 
uncertitude, shedding its safe cogencies. Nothing, thus, reveals the 
boundary of metaphysics—metaphysics’ ownmost edge—disjunctively 
disclosing that if one is to delve more originally or more primordially in­
to ontological matters another dimension of thinking is in order.
Because Nothing is not a logical negation, it “is” on a higher plane 
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than beings “are.” If Nothing were negative nothingness—a “not”—it 
would have to be written as “nothing,” the “not” among beings. But 
since Nothing “Is” in the sense of being on the same ontological plane 
as Being, it must be written in the higher case, which is why, in refer­
ring to both Being and Nothing, Heidegger capitalizes and italicizes his 
assertion, “both Are” (Es gibt brides). Nothing is not simply a “con­
ceptual opposite” (Gegenbegrjff) of beings, but “belongs originally to 
essence itself.”11 It is inextricably linked with Being and has equal 
status in the essenc-ing process, which is evident in Heidegger’s conten­
tion that “in the Being of beings the nihilation of Nothing occurs.”12
11 “Zur Seinesfrage,” reprinted in Wegmarken (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1967), p.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Was heisst Denken? (Tubingen: Niemeyer, 1954), p. 86.
Although Nothing is catalytic to Dasein *s awesome awakening that 
beings “are,” and to the further implication that Being is the Beingness 
of beings, when he addresses this matter he invariably equates Nothing 
with “concealment” (Verborgenheit) and Being with “unconceal­
ment” (Unverborgenheit). On that plane, thus, a continual dialectical 
interplay exists between Being and Nothing to the point where Heideg­
ger can speak of a “unity,” despite the obvious diversity. Concealment 
and unconcealment are parcels of the same confluence, for even though 
Being can be concealed, it can never logically be negated. Its conceal­
ment always “Is,” and even though Nothing conceals, it never logical­
ly “is not.” In that sense, Being and Nothing “Are.” And precisely 
because they “Are,” prior to logical affirmation and logical negation, 
they cannot be apprehended through logical thinking, through the ra­
tional spectacles Western,philosophy has worn since its origins.
According to Heidegger, “the involvement with thought is in itself a 
rare thing, reserved for a few people,”13 a reservation which has 
nothing to do with the intentions of thinking, but everything to do with 
concealment and unconcealment inherent in Being: “Devoted thought 
is not something we produce and carry along. .. . When we think what 
above all must be thought, we then give thought to what this concern 
itself gives us to think about.”14 That Heidegger believes Being con­







dent in his contention that metaphysics is not only a “veil” 
(Verhiillung), but also one which is “unavoidable” (unumganglich). 
This is why he regards the preliminaries of Western metaphysics as 
“fateful beginnings” (geschickhafter Beginn) and as “destiny” 
(Geschick), and why he contends that the essential nature of thinking— 
any thinking—“is determined [bestimmt] by what there is to be 
thought about: the presence of what is present, the Being of beings.”15
15 Ibid., p. 158.
16 Ibid., p. 244.
17 Zur Sache des Denkens (Tubingen: Niemeyer, 1969), p. 76.
'* Ibid., p. 78.
19 Ibid., p. 9.
Heidegger does not condemn traditional philosophy for its preoc­
cupation with the metaphysics of beings or for thinking “onto-theo- 
logically” (onto-theo-logisch), a leniency evident in his remark that 
“the reference to what is unthought in philosophy is not a criticism of 
philosophy.”16 17* What is unthought in philosophy is not due to 
philosophy’s neglect, but to Being’s concealment: "Lethe (conceal­
ment) belongs to a-letheia (un-concealment), not simply as an appen­
dage, not as a shadow to light, but as the heart of aletheia.”'1 Heideg­
ger, accordingly, does not view traditional metaphysics as a result of 
the miscalculations of earlier philosophers, nor a metaphysical doc­
trines as something “promoted by chance” (zufallig vorgebracht). The 
metaphysical principles of Plato, Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche are rather 
products of Being’s self-concealment, and their writings are “words of 
Being as responses to a claim which speaks in the sending concealing 
itself [szcA selber verbergendes Schicken].”'3 That concealment and un­
concealment are Being’s bequeathment, that metaphysical thinking as 
well as original thinking (should it arise) are Being’s manifestation, 
that being “on the way” is not a self-chosen journey but inherent in Be­
ing’s self-disclosure, are all evident in his assertion that “Nietzsche, as 
well as any other philosopher, has neither made nor chosen his way. He 
has been sent on his way.”19
The modern age is philosophically characterized by Heidegger as one 
which is not capable of thinking “what above all must be thought” 
(Das Bedenklichst). With biting irony he writes: “What above all must 
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be thought is that we are still not thinking.”20 But the fact that modern 
thinkers do not think “what above all must be thought” or most 
thought-provoking is not a human deficiency. It is an inherent 
character of the Being-process. If the dilemma were a product of 
human “neglect” (Saumnis), the neglect “could then be cured in 
human ways by appropriate measures.”21 Unfortunately, that which 
“what above all must be thought,” Heidegger explains, “turned away 
long ago.”22 Still, Heidegger’s implication is that as long as we 
recognize Being’s self-concealment and think about this concealment 
rigorously, we are “on the way” toward thinking what above all must 
be thought, “on the way” toward original thinking. Because what 
above all must be thought withdraws from thinking, attentiveness to 
this withdrawal is an initial step toward original thinking: “The real 
nature of thought might show itself, however, at that point where it 
once withdrew, if we will only pay attention to this withdrawal.”23 
Recognizing that we are not yet thinking, coupled with a recognition 
that what above all must be thought itself withdraws, is a prerequisite 
for original thinking.
20 Was heisst Denken?, p. 61.
21 Ibid., p. 2.
22 Ibid., p. 3.
23 Ibid., p. 4.
24 Ibid., p. 61.
25 “Non-being and Mu: The Metaphysical Nature of Negativity in the East and 
West,’’ Religious Studies 1! (June 1975), p. 186.
Zen's SQnyata
Contrasting the Zen position with the Western position in which Be­
ing always has priority over Non-being, in which “the positive princi­
ple is understood to have the ontological priority over the negative 
principle,”24 Abe Masao maintains that “only when the positive and 
the negative principles have equal force and are mutually negating is 
the dialectical structure of Sonyatd possible.”25 One must consider, 
does this sense of “equal force” and “mutual negation” coincide with 
Heidegger’s Being and Nothing, with unconcealment and conceal­
ment? Does not Heidegger’s Being nihilate itself, so that Being-as-un- 
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concealment becomes Nothing-as-concealment? And does not Nothing 
nihilate itself, so that Nothing-as-concealment becomes Being-as-un- 
concealment? Still, it must be said that even these radical Heideggerian 
notions do not coincide with what Zen means by “equal force” and 
“mutual negation.” As Abe explains, “Afw [Nothingness] is not one- 
sidedly derived through the negation from u [Being].”26 Zen’s mutual 
negation is not Heidegger’s alternating principle of affirmation and 
negation, but is a principle of simultaneous affirmation and negation in 
which the affirmation is the negation and the negation is the affirma­
tion. According to D. T. Suzuki, “Zen is a philosophy of absolute 
negations which are at the same time absolute affirmations; unless one 
gains a certain insight into this dialectic of negation-affirmation one 
has no right to say a word about Zen.”27 When asked what it means 
“to be devoid of discriminative knowledge,” Jdshu replied, “What are 
you talking about?”28 Joshu’s reply is most paradoxical in that he 
refuses to indulge in such “discriminations” as discrimination and 
non-discrimination. In Zen’s voiding of the Void, of its emptying of 
Emptiness, one cannot be attached to Void or Emptiness. Paraphras­
ing the Zen master Yung-chia, Chung-yuan Chang writes: “When we 
say that something is real it is not a relative reality. When we say that it 
is void, it is not a relative void. What is real is void, what is void is real. 
The identification of the void and the real is achieved by the absolute 
mind, which is free of all dichotomy.”29 Heidegger’s Nothing, in con­
trast to Zen’s SHnyata, is never itself absolutely identical with Being. 
Whereas Heidegger’s affirmation-negation is a relative principle, in 
that one principle is always relative to what it is not, Zen’s affirmation­
negation is an absolute principle, in that there is nothing that either 
principle is not.
26 Ibid., p. 186.
27 Ibid., p. 186.
28 The Zen Doctrine of No-Mind (London: Rider, 1969), p. 108.
29 Radical Zen: The Sayings of JOshQ, trans. Yoel Hoffman (Brookline, Mass.: 
Autumn Press, 1978), p. 28.
Though Heidegger treats Nothing in various ways—as a catalyst for 
the disclosure of Being, as the ontological source of negation, as on­
tological Difference, and as Being’s dynamic concealment—Being 
nonetheless has ontological priority in Heidegger’s thought. It is the Be­
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ing-question and the Being-process he is concerned with, not the 
Nothing-question or the Nothing-process. Zen would regard Heideg­
ger’s Being and Nothing as bifurcational, and would say that these 
must be emptied of themselves, to the point where one can say that Be­
ing is Nothing and that Nothing is being. Such a paradoxical assertion 
can be made not by virtue of a Bezng-process, but by virtue of a radical 
EmpZy/rtg-process. Whereas Heidegger gives priority to Being, to a 
dynamic essenc-ing, Zen gives pedagogical priority to Emptiness, to a 
dynamic Empty-ing prior to Heidegger’s relative Nothing. According 
to Ha Tai Kim, Zen “negates all the presuppositions of Being, thus 
making the concept of Nothing the alpha and omega of reality,” add­
ing that if there is a fundamental presupposition in Zen it is “absolute 
nothing.”30 And as Abe puts it, “the symbol of liberation is not ‘Be­
ing’ as the point of ontological priority of being to non-being, but the 
dynamism of ‘Emptiness’ which is simultaneously fullness.”31 Zen 
does indeed embrace Being, but it does not give Being priority over 
Nothingness. Moreover, because Being is attained by virtue of absolute 
Nothingness, Being itself is transformed absolutely, and cannot be 
thought of in the way the West envisioned it, as being over against 
Nothingness, or even as Heidegger has envisioned it, as Being integral 
with Nothingness.
30 “Ch’an and Buddhism: Logical and Illogical,** Philosophy East and West XVII 
(October 1962), p. 41.
31 “God, Emptiness, and the True Self,” The Eastern Buddhist II, 2 (November 
1969), p. 20.
32 “Non-being and Mu,” p. 189.
Not only are Heidegger’s Nothing and Zen’s Nothingness different, 
therefore, their understandings of Being are different. Abe’s distinc­
tion between the Western notion of “Being” and Zen’s notion of 
“Wondrous Being” is pertinent here: “The Buddhist idea of Won­
drous Being is clearly different from the Western idea of ‘Being’. ”32 
Heidegger’s Being is not Zen’s “Wondrous Being,” but the integral 
counterpart of Nothing. Whereas Heidegger’s Being is integral with 
Nothing, Zen’s “True Emptiness and Wondrous Being,” according to 
Abe, “are completely non-dualistic: absolute Mu and ultimate reality 
are totally identical, although the realization of the former is indispen­
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sable for the realization of the latter.”33 In Zen, the realization of ab­
solute Nothingness is paradoxically the realization of Wondrous Being, 
although in a pedagogical context Nothingness may be said to have 
priority. One may not proceed from Wondrous Being to Absolute 
Nothingess, because it is absolutely Empty-ing which dissolves all duali­
ty. Moreover, it is pedagogically not only through absolute Empty-ing 
that Wondrous Being is possible, it is through absolute Empty-ing—an 
absolute Empty-ing of Emptiness itself—that Wondrous Being and ab­
solute Emptiness are identical. Even Abe’s “primacy of Nothingness 
over Being,” thus, must entail another transformation, another radical 
Empty-ing. Although one must functionally begin with Nothingness in 
order to realize the absolute identification of Being and Nothingness, 




35 Ibid., p. 185.
36 Ibid., p. 186.
37 Ibid.
Although Heidegger’s Being and Nothing are the primordial sources 
of affirmation and negation, these are treated relationally. By contrast, 
alluding to Nagarjuna, Abe, explains that in Zen “Emptiness is not a 
mere emptiness as opposed to fullness. Emptiness as SOnyatG 
transcends and embraces both emptiness and fullness.”34 Clearly, this 
is not what Heidegger means by Nothing. Heidegger’s Nothing does 
not transcend and embrace itself and Being; rather it is integrally 
related to Being. For Zen, Nothingness not only transcends and em­
braces itself and Being, Nothingness is Being, which is why, again 
alluding to NagSrjuna, Abe refers to “true Emptiness” as “Wondrous 
Being.”35
Heidegger’s Nothing, despite its primordial ontological status, 
despite its radically compared with traditional metaphysics, is a 
“relative” negation, not what Abe calls, synonymously, “absolute 
negation,” “double negation,” and “the negation of the negation.”36 
Heidegger’s Nothing does not undergo “double negation,” does not 
negate itself, and is never absolutely identical with “Wondrous Be­
ing,” so that “the negation of the negation is the affirmation.”37 
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Translating this into more mundane language, one might associate or­
dinary affirmation with the notion that mountains are mountains, 
associate “relative” negation with the notion that mountains are not 
mountains, and associate “absolute” or “double negation” with the 
notion that mountains Are mountains. In philosophic language, again, 
Abe argues, “thus we may say that absolute negation is absolute 
affirmation and absolute affirmation is absolute negation.”38 This, Abe 
notes, is a “paradoxical statement.”39 But considering that Heideg­
ger’s Nothing is relational (with regard to Being) and, in Abe’s sense, 
“relative,” it would be misleading, from the Zen point of view, to refer 
to it as paradoxical. Although Heidegger’s thought is often referred to 
as paradoxical in the light of traditional metaphysics, one could not 
refer to Heidegger’s thought as paradoxical in the light of Zen. At best, 




It is important to understand that Zen is not a radical negation of 
everything. If this were so, a charge of nihilism could be levied against 
it. Once the Zen student reaches the point of radical negation, once he 
reaches the point where negation and affirmation as ordinarily 
understood are emptied of their logical relationship, the Zen master 
will not permit him to remain at this dreadful precipice. Unless the stu­
dent realizes that radical negation is itself radical affirmation, his 
realization is not complete. This in fact is why the master, on occasion, 
may slap the student. Just at that uncanny point where the student has 
the realization of radical negation, the master dramatically assists him 
in the realization of radical affirmation, not only by way of a slap in the 
face but as a slap in the face, disclosing that negation is itself affirma­
tion, and that no amount of thinking, however dialectical, can repre­
sent this concrete fact. This is most illustrative in a dialogue between 
Sekkyd and one of his monks:
SekkyO (Shih-kung) asked one of his accomplished monks, 
“Can you take hold of empty space?”
“Yes, sir,” he replied.
“Show me how you do it.”
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The monk stretched out his arm and clutched at empty 
space.
SekkyO said: “Is that the way? But after all you have not 
got anything.’’
“What then,” asked the monk, “is your way?”
The master straightway took hold of the monk’s nose and 
gave it a hard pull, which made the latter exclaim: “Oh, oh, 
how hard you pull at my nose! You are hurting terribly!”
“That is the way to have a good hold of empty space,” said 
the master.40
41 Quoted in D. T. Suzuki, An Introduction to Zen Buddhism (New York: Grove 
Press, 1964), p. 84.
42 “Non-being and Mu” p. 192.
The thrust of this dialogue is that empty space is paradoxically full, 
that one cannot treat Zen Nothingness in the usual ways of affirmation 
and negation, and most vividly, that Zen is not only as life-like as the 
pulling of a nose, but is the pulling of a nose, that Zen is none other 
than life itself.
Although Abe has an in-depth understanding of Zen and has written 
about it brilliantly and informatively, it is doubtful that he has studied 
Heidegger as rigorously. Although one of his tasks has been to make 
important distinctions between East and West, especially between Zen 
and the West, he too hastily overlooks these distinctions with regard to 
Heidegger. Although one may be sympathetic with Abe’s statement 
that “Martin Heidegger takes the issue of ‘nothingess’ seriously and, 
perhaps, the most profoundly in Western history,”41 his further con­
tention that Heidegger’s Nothing “is strikingly similar to Buddhist 
understanding of Emptiness”42 is off the mark. On the contrary, a 
careful, comparative explication of Heidegger’s Nothing and Zen’s 
Nothingness will show—as I have tried to show—that they are striking­
ly dissimilar. Though Abe recognizes that, in Heidegger’s thought, “to 
encounter nothingness is to overcome the forgetfulness with regard to 
Being,”43 and uses this as the basis for that striking similarity, Zen’s 
Nothingness is more than a catalyst of disclosure. It is, rather—using
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Abe’s own words—not “merely a gate to reach the hall of ultimate 
Reality. Instead it in itself is the hall of ultimate Reality.”44
44 Ibid.
Heidegger's Sein-zum-Ende
In accordance with his concern for Dasein’s anticipatory apprehen­
sion of its future, and in conjunction with his concern for Dasein’s 
structural wholeness which begins with its “thrownness” (Geworf- 
enheit), Heidegger argues that Dasein must find its completion in 
death. But Dasein’s death is most unique compared with non-Dasein- 
like beings in that it is ontological: though non-Z>asei7i-like beings ob­
viously partake of cessation as necessarily rounding out their structural 
wholes, Dasein’s cessation is more dynamic by virtue of its existing or 
dying towards its cessation. Although the fruit’s “not-yet” (Noch- 
nicht) is already included or even precluded in its very being (its “not- 
yet” being no more than a manifestation of its organic process, a “not- 
yet” of which it is obviously unaware), Dasein is aware of its cessation, 
a cessation which is not merely “finished” (Zu-Ende-sein), but more 
ecstatically, “Being-towards-the-end” (Sein-zum-Ende). Dasein’s 
death, therefore, is not merely a teleological fact, but “a way to be” 
(eine Weise zu sein) in terms of “anticipation.” Although the fruit’s 
death and Dasein’s death are undisputably given, only Dasein (as a 
“who,” not a “what”) can ex-sist “towards” that death in such a way 
that death will serve as a disclosure about the authenticity or inauthen­
ticity of its being; and whereas the cessation of the fruit if the “fulfill­
ment” (Vollendung) of its being, Dasein’s cessation usually ends up in 
“unfulfillment” (Unvollendung) meaning that in its cessation Dasein 
rarely realizes its ownmost potentialities. The importance of Dasein’s 
existing “towards” death is that death may serve as a disclosure of 
unrealized potentialities and serve as a catalyst for authentic existing.
Death is always Dasein’s “ownmost potentiality” (eigenste 
Moglichkeit). No Dasein can die another Dasein’s death, and no in­
dividual Dasein can take refuge in the universal fact that all Daseins 
die, which is why Heidegger calls attention to Dasein’s death as “non­
relational” (unbezuglich) and as that which is not to be “outstripped” 
(uniiberholbar). In fact, it is attempting to take refuge in the death of
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others which is indicative of an inauthentic mode of being towards 
death, according to Heidegger, a refuge which does indeed strip Dasein 
of its ownmost potentialities. In an authentic being towards death 
“one is liberated in such a way that for the first time one can genuinely 
understand and choose among factical possibilities existing ahead of 
that possibility which is not to be outstripped.’’45 It is for this reason 
that Heidegger equates “dread” with an authentic being
45 Ibid., p. 189.
46 Zur Sache des Denkens, p. 264.
47 Ibid., p. 266.
48 Earth and Gods: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961), p.55.
towards death, maintaining that “Being-towards-death is essentially 
dread.”46 Dread undermines the safeguards and consolations about 
death that may be imbibed from the “they” (Man) or from reflecting 
on death universally, by bluntly revealing that one will indeed die. 
Death, therefore, is a way to be which Dasein takes over as soon as it 
is.
Zen *s Mind Unborn, Mind Undestroyed
Dasein dies. It dies not in the way other beings die, that is, in merely 
ceasing to be, but exists “towards” its cessation. Its cessation is not 
strictly a cessation, therefore, but a “way to be.” It is precisely this 
“way to be” towards an end, however, that Zen prefers to transcend. 
Reflecting on Heidegger’s notion of death, Vincent Vicynas contends 
that “death is that which makes Dasein really Dasein, just as night 
makes day to stand out as day. Without night, day would never be 
perceived as day; it would lack its somethingness.”47 Whereas Heideg­
ger argues that in order for Dasein to be authentic it must not only over­
come its preoccupation with beings and comport itself towards Being, 
but must accept its inevitable dying, its ineluctable finitude, an accep­
tance which he calls “resoluteness” (Entschlossenheit), Zen would say 
that “acceptance” of death is not enough, that “acceptance” could 
not characterize what it means by resolution. For even when the Self 
“accepts” its own non-being, it is still immersed in the tension of op­
posites. Whereas Heidegger views death as Dasein's inevitable 
evanescence “which Dasein takes on as soon as it exists,”48 referring to 
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death as the “absolute impotence of Dasein’' (schiechthinnige Dasein- 
sunmoglichkeit) and as the “absolute negation of Dasein” 
(schlechthinnig Nichtigkeit des Daseins), from the Zen viewpoint 
nothing can negate the Self because ultimately the Self is Selfless, 
beyond positivity and negativity, beyond the tension that dualities 
necessitate. As Hui-hai expressed it when he was asked what is meant 
as to perceiving the real state of Buddhahood: “It means no longer 
perceiving anything as existing or not exisiting.”49 Huang-po similarly 
maintains, “Where nothing is sought this implies Mind unborn; where 
no attachment exists, this implies Mind not destroyed; and that which 
is neither born nor destroyed is the Buddha.”50 And as Yung-chia terse­
ly phrased it in his Song of Actualizing Bodhi, “Neither life nor death 
concerns me.”51
49 Sein und Zeit, 10th ed. (Tiibingen: Niemeyer, 1963), p. 245.
30 John Blofeld, trans., The Zen Teaching of Hui Hai (New York: Samuel Weiser, 
1972), p. 71.
51 John Blofeld, trans., The Zen Teaching of Huang Po (New York: Grove Press, 
1958), p. 40.
52 Quoted in Shin’ichi Hisamatsu, Zen and the Fine Arts (Tokyo: KOdansha, 1971), 
p. 17.
53 Einfuhrung in die Metaphysik, p. 136.
Heidegger is not concerned with Dase/n-lessness in the way that Zen 
is concerned with Self-lessness, with Not-Dase/>! in the way that Zen is 
concerned with Not-Self. When Heidegger writes, “Not-Dasem” 
(Nicht-dasein) in Einfiihrung in die Metaphysik, he is referring to the 
inevitable possibility of Dasein no longer being the There of Being. 
Moreover, this sense of Not-Dasein reinforces the notion of “mutual 
challenge” between Dasein and Being. Given the priority of being over 
Dasein, a priority in which Dasein may be “smashed to pieces” (zer- 
brechen), Dasein’s only way of responding to this overwhelming power 
is to accept it. The only “triumph” (Sieg) it can have is to cease to be: 
“Not-being-dosezn is Dasein’s highest triumph over Being.”52 This 
“triumph,” however, from the Zen point of view, is at best a Pyrrhic 
victory. It is by no means as radical or as resolute as what Zen means 
by the “great Death,” a Death which is “the total negation of life-and- 




Though in Sein und Zeit Heidegger speaks of Dasein as 
“transcendence” (Transzendenz) in that it represents a dimension 
unavailable to other beings, capable of surpassing its own essence as a 
being and realizing a more essential relation to Being, this surpassing 
cannot be taken in any supraphenomenal or supraimmanental sense. 
For though Heidegger describes Dasein as “transcendence,” he also 
refers to it as “finitude” (Endlichkeit). Dasein is a being among beings 
and therefore finite; yet it is a most unique being that it can exist in a 
way that non-Ztoe/rt-like beings may not. This quality of Dasein, 
which allows it to be a being among beings and also to partake of a 
“dimension” (Dimension) unavailable to non-Ztoe/n-like beings, 
Heidegger calls “the deepest finitude of transcendence.”54 It is what 
William Richardson refers to as “the radical finitude of man.”55 Still, 
by recognizing a radical finitude that stands over against that which 
might be regarded as infinity, by recognizing what Richardson aptly 
refers to as “the finite There of finite Being,”56 57Heidegger cannot pro­
vide a resolution to death in Zen’s sense. In fact, it is precisely this 
dichotomy of the finite and the infinite that Zen prefers to transcend.
54 “Non-being and Mu,” p. 190.
55 Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1951), 
p. 214.
,6 Heidegger, Through Phenomenology to Thought (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1963), p. 33.
57 Through Phenomenology to Thought, p. 539.
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